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Wasted! 
Resource recovery and waste management in Cuba 
 
Michael Ahlheim1, Maike Becker2, Yeniley Allegue Losada3, Heike Trastl4 
 
Abstract 
The collection of solid waste and the recovery of recyclable material from waste 
belong to the many challenges Cuba has been facing over the past years. In this 
paper, we give a short account of the actual waste situation and analyze the 
causes of the obvious deficiencies of the waste sector. We conducted a small 
survey in Havana city in order to assess people's awareness of the garbage 
problem, their appraisal of the actual situation and their willingness to 
contribute personally to an improvement of the waste situation. Based on the 
insights gained from this survey and from our theoretical analysis of the Cuban 
waste management we develop suggestions for an improvement of the waste 
situation in Cuba. These suggestions take into account that the financial means 
available for a reform of the waste management system in Cuba are severely 
restricted. Therefore, our suggestions are more focused on organizational and 
motivational changes than on the introduction of high technology.  
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1. Introduction: Waste in Havana – first impressions 
Visitors to Havana are surprised to find huge heaps of garbage at many street corners not only 
in the residential areas outside the city but also in its Historic Centre. While for them the 
obvious deficiencies in garbage collection constitute only a minor aesthetical impairment of 
an otherwise beautiful city, things are much more serious for the permanent residents of 
Havana. Waste is accumulating in most streets over two weeks and more before it is collected 
by the Municipal Communal Services Administration, the so-called "communales". This leads 
to major sanitary problems since various kinds of animals like rats or mosquitos settle down 
in the waste. In the rainy seasons contaminated water is leaking from the waste heaps. As a 
result, the health of the population is impaired by contagious diseases caused by the deficient 
waste management (cf. Louro 2013).  
According to the administration responsible for garbage collection, they are required to collect 
the garbage in residential areas at least every 72 hours. In reality, this often happens only 
every fortnight or even more rarely. The reasons for that are manifold. There are technical 
reasons like broken waste trucks, which are not repaired in time, and destroyed garbage 
containers, which cannot be moved or lifted off the ground in order to be emptied into the 
garbage trucks (cf. Alberty 2014). However, there are also social or psychological reasons, 
which are suspected to be due to the mentality of the residents on the one hand and of the 
public servants of the communales on the other. Especially in the poorer and more run-down 
areas of Havana, residents do not really seem to care for the garbage situation. Additionally, 
the current situation is influenced by elements of corruption, demoralization and lack of 
control among communal workers. This has a direct impact on the waste management but 
also on the hygienic-epidemiological situation of the capital (cf. Alberty 2014, Louro 2013). It 
is neither clear if the population is aware of the garbage problem nor what people's attitude 
towards this problem is. Therefore, we conducted a small face-to-face survey in the city of 
Havana in order to highlight these issues and to identify possible solutions to the garbage 
collection problem, which might be based on people's opinions and their willingness to 
cooperate with the city administration in order to improve the garbage situation.  
Garbage collection is not the only waste problem in Cuba. The recovery of recyclable materials 
from the collected solid waste is practiced in Cuba, but the treatment and final disposal of the 
rest of the solid waste is inappropriate and puts the environment in the neighborhood of the 
landfills and the health of the population at risk (cf. Lloréns et al. 2008 and 2009).  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will assess the garbage situation in 
Havana from the residents' perspective using a small citizen survey. We will first explain the 
details of our survey and then present its results. In section 3 we will give a comprehensive 
account of the actual garbage collection and treatment practice in Cuba, while in section 4 we 
will develop some recommendations for an improvement of the waste management system 
without prohibitively high costs. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. 
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2.  A Contingent Valuation survey in Havana - What do Cuban people think? 
In March 2018 we conducted a small-scale face-to-face survey in Havana in order to gain 
better insights into people's awareness of the garbage problem and their opinions regarding 
the causes of this problem and possibilities to cope with it in the future. We also wanted to 
find out to which extent they would be willing to assume responsibility personally by 
contributing financially to an improvement of the garbage management in Havana.  
2.1  The survey 
This survey followed, in principle, the so-called Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) for the 
assessment of the social benefits accruing from public projects for which no market prices 
exist (cf. e.g. Atkinson and Mourato 2008, Carson and Hanemann 2005 or Bateman et al. 
2002). Public projects causing environmental effects create different kinds of benefits. In the 
case of an improved waste collection system people's personal situation would improve e.g. 
because their neighborhood would be enhanced under hygienic and aesthetical aspects. This 
is the so-called use value of a public project (cf. Nunes 2002, p. 4), i.e. the value that accrues 
to people on site who receive an immediate and personal benefit from the project in question. 
Beyond these benefits, people might appreciate the idea that also future generations can 
enjoy the improved technical and logistical infrastructure for waste collection that would be 
built up today in the course of such a project. These benefits accruing to people living today 
from the knowledge that also the living conditions of future generations would be enhanced 
by the public project are called its bequest value. Bequest values belong to the category of the 
so-called nonuse values (cf. Bateman et al. 2002) created by a public project. The CVM aims 
at the assessment of the total value of public projects, which consists of both, use and nonuse 
values. 
The questionnaire we used in our survey consisted of three main parts. In the first part, we 
asked people about their own experience with and their own view of the garbage collection 
problem in Havana. We wanted to know if they notice the garbage heaps in the streets and if 
they know about the environmental and health problems arising from them. We inquired also 
into their opinions regarding the causes of the actual garbage situation in most housing areas 
and we asked who they think should be held responsible for this situation.    
In the second part, we wanted to find out if they were willing to contribute personally to 
improve the situation by paying a newly introduced monthly garbage fee. The money collected 
through this new fee would be used to finance an improved garbage management system, 
which in our questionnaire was called WaMaHav ("Improved Waste Management system for 
Havana"). After a detailed description of this hypothetical project, we asked respondents if 
they were, in principle, willing to support the implementation of such a waste management 
system by paying a new garbage fee. To those who answered "yes" we presented a so-called 
Payment Card with 15 different payment intervals, ranging from "0 CUP", "1 to 5 CUP", "6 to 
15 CUP" etc. up to "More than 320 CUP". Then we asked them to tick the interval with the 
maximum amount of the fee, which they would be willing to pay in order to get WaMaHav 
realized.  
In CVM studies, the amount an individual is willing to pay for the realization of a public project 
is interpreted as the monetary expression of the utility or benefits the individual expects from 
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that project. The higher the willingness to pay (WTP) of an individual for a public project is, 
the higher are the benefits expected. The sum of the WTP amounts of all individuals affected 
by a public project is interpreted as the total social value of that project. In order to assess this 
social value CVM interviews are conducted with a representative sample of all individuals 
affected. The mean or average WTP of this sample is then multiplied by the number of all 
people affected in order to assess the social value. Obviously, this procedure leads to useful 
results only if the mean WTP of the sample equals the mean WTP of the target population, i.e. 
if the sample is representative. In our case, we conducted street intercept interviews with only 
43 persons, so we could not hope for more than a rather superficial snapshot of Havana 
residents' opinions as well as their WTP. A more precise picture could be gained only from a 
much larger study with at least 1,000 completed interviews (cf. Arrow et al. 1993). In the third 
part of our questionnaire, we asked respondents about their personal socio-demographic data 
like e.g. gender, age, income, educational level and their job situation.  
2.2  Survey results 
All of our respondents were citizens of Havana, 72% of them were even born there. They came 
from all 15 districts of Havana, but most of them were from Centro Habana (32%) or Habana 
Vieja (13%). The average age was 45 years, 61% of the respondents were married or divorced 
and 58% had children. About 28% of the respondents were government employees, while 31% 
were self-employed. About 13% were students or trainees and 10% were retired.  
All respondents considered garbage collection services in Havana insufficient and they were 
also concerned about negative consequences for their health and for the environment in 
general. When asked about the three most important environmental consequences of the 
garbage collection problem, 79% of our respondents chose at least one of the three kinds of 
water pollution offered for selection in our questionnaire (surface water, ground water, 
Havana Bay), 58% selected the "Impairment of the beauty of the city" and 51% stated that the 
garbage pollutes the air. We then wanted to know which health problems they attributed to 
the insufficient garbage collection practice. From the catalogue we offered them, 56% of the 
respondents chose "Problems with the respiratory system", 47% named health problems 
caused by contaminated tap water in households and 40% held the insufficient waste 
collection practice responsible for skin problems.  
After that we wanted to know (using a five-point Likkert scale from "not serious at all" to "very 
serious") how serious respondents considered a number of different consequences of the 
careless waste collection practice in Havana. Here 97.6% of the respondents found the fact 
that "Waste in the streets as habitat and nutrition for animals like rats, cockroaches, flies and 
mosquitos" was either "serious" (11.9%), "quite serious" (11.9%) or "very serious" (76.2%). 
Similarly, high scored the "Smell from the waste deposition in the streets", which 97.6% of our 
respondents found either "serious" (9.5%), "quite serious" (26.2%) or "very serious" (61.9%). 
Further, the "Sight of waste in the streets" appeared to 95.3% of respondents either "serious" 
(21.4%), "quite serious" (19.1%) or "very serious" (54.8%). While people are obviously worried 
most about the animals living in the garbage heaps and, probably, the threat they pose to 
human health, also aesthetic values like the smell or sight of garbage seem to bother them 
considerably. All these effects of the garbage problem lead to direct losses of people's 
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wellbeing in the sense that they are immediately affected by them. It turns out that, in 
addition to these direct effects, our respondents were also worried about more general effects 
like groundwater pollution (70.7% find it either "serious", "quite serious" or "very serious"), 
surface water pollution (78.1%), soil pollution (66.7%) or the effects on tourism (75.6%). All of 
these effects do not necessarily affect their own wellbeing. This shows that at least the 
members of our survey sample were concerned not only about their own wellbeing but also 
about threats to the wellbeing of society as a whole. Interestingly, nearly 50% of our 
respondents did not believe that "Other people living in Havana are aware of the problems 
accruing from inefficient waste management", while nearly 100% of them said that they 
themselves were concerned. This asymmetric perception of their own awareness of the 
garbage problem on the one hand and the awareness of others on the other hand is rather 
surprising and hints already at a certain degree of skepticism regarding the sense of 
responsibility of other members of society.  
When asked what the main causes of the ineffectiveness of the garbage management in 
Havana are, 63% of our respondents found that "There are not enough garbage containers in 
the streets", 52% thought that "There are not enough trucks for the transportation of garbage" 
and 49% of the respondents held the "Inefficiency of administration" responsible for the 
problem. It was amazing that 80% of the respondents answered "no" to the question, if 
corruption could be a cause of the garbage problem, while in personal discussions people 
often pointed at exactly this possibility when asked. Here we might have a typical case of 
socially or politically desirable responding, where respondents do not state their true opinion 
but give answers, which they think are "politically correct". It was also surprising that more 
than 90% of our respondents stated that the "Lack of social responsibility of people" was 
responsible for the garbage situation in Havana. This result corresponds closely with our 
previous finding that our respondents did not trust in their fellow citizens' awareness and 
correct assessment of the garbage problem.  
Of course, people in Havana would like to have a much better garbage collection service than 
they have today. When asked "How often do you think garbage should be collected in 
Havana?", 56% of the respondents answered "Every day". More than 33% wanted their waste 
to be collected even twice a day. Obviously, people's wishes are far from reality here. When 
asked which policy measure they would recommend to improve the actual situation, 69% of 
the respondents suggested to install more trash bins in the streets and to provide new 
containers for household waste (also 69%), while 58% suggested to implement a monitoring 
system for the garbage trucks to make sure that they really service the whole area for which 
they are responsible. Interestingly, 76% of our respondents wished a better "Education of 
children in school on the topic". This, again, corresponds very nicely with our previous finding 
that people put the blame for the garbage problem on the lack of responsible behavior of their 
fellow citizens. Obviously, the "human factor" is considered one of the major causes of the 
garbage problems.  
After having obtained this rather comprehensive impression of people's attitude towards the 
garbage situation in Havana we wanted to know if they were willing to contribute personally 
to an improvement of the situation. In our questionnaire, we presented a waste management 
scenario to them describing the above-mentioned WaMaHav system: 
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"Scientists have suggested a public program for an improvement of the garbage 
situation in Havana. This program is called "Improved Waste Management of 
Havana" (WaMaHav). It comprises among others policy measures like the 
installation of more waste bins in all districts of the city, more trucks for waste 
collection, strict monitoring of garbage truck drivers to force them to do their duty, 
investment in new containers for household garbage and environmental education. 
Further, they want to ensure that garbage is collected at least every third day in all 
districts in the city." 
 
Then we asked if, in principle, they would support this program if they had to pay a new 
garbage fee in order to get it realized. Surprisingly, 92.5% of our respondents answered this 
question in the affirmative. This proves that people in Havana are, indeed, serious about the 
necessity to change the existing practice of garbage collection, at least as far as our survey 
sample is concerned. In the next step, we wanted to obtain a quantitative impression of their 
readiness to support a change in the garbage collection practice by asking the following 
question: 
"Considering the benefits of this program for you personally and for all people living 
in Havana we would like to ask you to mark in the following list which amount of a 
garbage fee your household would be willing to accept at maximum in order to get 
the WaMaHav project realized: … 
(It follows a Payment Card with 15 different payment intervals, ranging from "0 CUP", 
"1 to 5 CUP", "6 to 15 CUP" etc. up to "More than 320 CUP")" 
 
From the amounts marked in the payment card we computed a mean willingness to pay (WTP) 
for WaMaHav of 24 CUP per month, which corresponds to nearly 1 Euro per month. This 
amounts to roughly 1% of the average income of our sample members.  
 
Summing up, our results show that among the population of Havana there is a high degree of 
awareness of the garbage collection problem, the threats it poses to the environment in 
general as well as to human health. We also found that people are ready to contribute 
personally and financially to an improvement of the garbage situation in Havana. This 
emphasizes that the topic of our research here is, indeed, relevant for the population of 
Havana. In the next section we will analyze in detail how the waste management in Havana 
and in Cuba in general is organized and where sources of inefficiency might be located.  
 
3.  The waste collection and management system in Cuba 
3.1 The organization of waste management in Cuba 
The organization of waste management in Cuba is rather complex. Its main structure is shown 
in the diagram in fig. 1. Our analysis here will be oriented towards this diagram. Total waste 
in Cuba consists of waste from public enterprises in the production and service sector and of 
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private waste coming from households and from private enterprises, e.g. restaurants, small 
hostels and various service units. Private waste can be disaggregated into residual waste (RW) 
and recyclable material (RM). Private households dispose of their waste into public garbage 
containers placed in their neighborhood. Typically, they do not separate their waste into a 
residual waste fraction and a recyclable material fraction. Nevertheless, some private 
households do this and bring their recyclable material directly to so-called Buyback Centers 
("casas de compra")5 where they get a small amount of money for it. The collection of the 
residual waste is organized by the Municipal Communal Services Administration (MCSA)6, also 
called the communales. According to the law, their trucks are supposed to collect the waste 
every 72 hours or even more frequently and bring it directly to one of the landfills. In practice, 
the waste removal service does not adhere to this time schedule in many parts of the city. The 
reasons for that are manifold and will be discussed below in detail.  
 
  
-  Fig. 1: The Waste Management System of Cuba  - 
 
Though most private households as well as private enterprises do not separate their garbage 
actively, some of the recyclable materials are still recovered from their garbage by 
                                                     
5 Casas de Compra (Buyback Centers): A national network of small establishments located in urban areas that 
buy directly raw materials from the citizens and other organizations. 
6 Dirección Municipal de Servicios Comunales (Municipal Communal Services Administration - communales): This 
is a government institution responsible for the collection and disposal of solid waste (either to landfills or to 
the Recyclable Material Recovery Enterprises). Besides their primary function, the communales bear also the 
responsibility for sweeping the streets, sidewalks and other common areas as well as for environmental 
sanitation. 
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Independent Contractors for Recyclable Material Collection (IC)7 on the one hand and by 
Cooperatives for Recyclable Material Recovery (CRMR)8 on the other. These Cooperatives are 
usually spin-offs of public enterprises and are organized like private firms. Like the ICs they 
depend on making profits of their own as an income because they are not paid by government. 
ICs as well as CRMRs pay private households and enterprises for the recyclable material they 
collect from them, even though these are only small amounts of money. The Independent 
Contractors bring the collected material together with other recyclable materials they collect 
directly from public waste containers, landfills etc. to the Buyback Centers where they get paid 
for it. The Buyback Centers belong to the Recyclable Material Recovery Enterprises at a 
provincial level (RMRE) 9, where the valuable material is recycled and then sold to the national 
and international industry. The Cooperatives sell the recyclable material directly to the 
national industry.  
There are also recyclable material collection activities organized by the young Pioneers 
("Pioneros")10 and the so-called Committees for the Defence of the Revolution ("Comités de 
Defensa de la Revolución" - CDR)11. Differently from the ICs these organizations collect 
recyclable material without paying for it. The communales who already collect the residual 
waste are also involved in the collection of recyclable materials from private households and 
enterprise and they do not pay for them, too. The Pioneers, the Committees and the 
communales deliver the recyclable materials they collect directly to the provincial RMREs, 
where from this group only the communales get paid for these materials.  
The waste produced by the public sector can also be subdivided into recyclable material and 
residual waste. Public enterprises are obliged by law to separate their waste into recyclable 
material and residual waste. The residual waste is collected by the communales and delivered 
directly to one of the landfills. No money payments are involved here. Part of the recyclable 
material is collected by the Cooperatives for Recyclable Material Recovery who pay for these 
materials. As explained above, they sell the recyclable materials directly to the national 
industry. The other part of the recyclable material is also collected by the communales and 
then sold to the RMREs.  
                                                     
7 Trabajadores por cuenta propia (Independent Contractors for Recyclable Material Collection - IC): Independent 
workers who collect and pick up recyclable material from private garbage and sell it to the Buyback Centers. 
They are not subordinated to any firm or organization. 
8 Cooperativas de Recuperación de Materias Primas (Cooperatives for Recyclable Material Recovery - CRMR): 
Independent Cooperatives, which collect recyclable material from private and public waste and sell it to the 
national industry. 
9  Empresa Provincial de Recuperación de Materias Primas (Recyclable Material Recovery Enterprise at the 
provincial level - RMRE): Government enterprise responsible for recycling at the provincial level. It belongs to 
the Union of Recyclable Materials Recovery Enterprises (national level). 
10  Pioneros (Pioneers): It refers to Cuban children and adolescents (between five and fifteen years of age) who 
are part of the "José Martí" Pioneer Organization. This organization carries out sports, cultural, recreational 
activities and also social responsibility activities like collecting garbage. 
11  Comités de Defensa de la Revolución (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution - CDR): Non-governmental 
organization composed of the population older than 14 years. It is spread all over the country, both in rural 
and urban areas. This mass organization carries out different socially supportive activities such as volunteer 
work, health promotion (vaccinations, blood donations, etc.), protection of the environment and also the 
collection of recyclable materials. 
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In principle, this procedure is rather similar for all 15 provinces of Cuba. Each provincial RMREs 
forwards its recyclable material to the Union of Recyclable Materials Recovery Enterprises 
(URMRE)12, which works at the national level. The URMRE sells the ferrous part of the metallic 
waste as well as the non-metallic waste to the national industry. The non-ferrous metallic 
scrap is sold in the national and also in the international markets, where it is paid for in 
convertible currency which then is converted into CUC. Applying the prices of the international 
market of recycled waste, the combination of the import substitution and/or the export of the 
non-ferrous metallic scrap represent more than 200 million dollars of savings to the national 
economy (cf. Tamayo 2017). 
3.2 The performance of the waste management in Cuba 
There are two main kinds of deficiencies of the Cuban waste management system, which are 
interrelated with each other. As described in detail in sections 1 and 2 of this paper, the private 
waste is collected not frequently enough so that heaps of garbage and overflowing garbage 
containers mark the picture of many streets in Havana and in other cities in Cuba. The 
uncollected waste provides habitat for many kinds of animals like rats, cockroaches, 
mosquitos and other species, which pose a potential threat to human health. Another 
consequence of the sloppy garbage collection and separation practice is that a much lower 
fraction of the waste is recycled in Cuba than would be possible. This causes an enormous loss 
of valuable scrap and, accordingly, of money since more raw materials have to be imported 
and less raw material can be exported than under a functioning and efficient waste separation 
and recycling regime.  
 
 
-  Fig. 2: The three main fractions of recycled raw material in Cuba  - 
 
In Cuba, about 400 thousand tons of waste are recycled every year (cf. Cubadebate 2013). 
Comparing the recycling rates of 1963 and 2017 (cf. fig. 2), one finds that there has been a 
                                                     
12 Unión de Empresas de Recuperación de Materias Primas (Union of Recyclable Materials Recovery Enterprises 
- URMRE): This government institution is responsible for the collection, processing and sale of recyclable 
waste generated in the private and state sectors in the areas of production and services. 
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considerable growth in the recycling of metallic scrap (ferrous and non-ferrous) while the 
recycling of non-metallic waste is still in its infancy13 (cf. Jank 2018). 
The reason for that is that in Cuba even today a suitable technology for the recycling of many 
kinds of non-metallic waste is not available or not applicable. Also for metallic waste, 
especially non-ferrous scrap, an increase in the recycling rate would be desirable. In the next 
subsection, we will analyze the main causes of these deficiencies of the Cuban waste 
management. 
3.3 Causes and sources of failure in Cuban waste management 
The analysis in this section will be based on fFig. 1 again. It has been mentioned before that 
the collection of private residual waste by the trucks of the communales is rather erratic and 
unreliable. Residents of certain parts of Havana often have to wait for more than two weeks 
until their garbage is collected. Reasons for that are, among others, technical deficiencies of 
many garbage trucks and a much too small number of trucks as well as of drivers, but also the 
poor work ethic and the low skills of the garbage workers. One consequence of the infrequent 
garbage collection is that the containers are overflowing so that litter is spread on the ground 
around the containers. When the collection trucks eventually arrive, the drivers typically do 
not care to collect the litter around the containers and to clean up the street. For that task, 
special units of garbage workers are responsible but also they mostly do a rather sloppy job. 
When the containers are broken, which is often the case, part of the garbage drops in the 
street where it then rests until it is blown away by the wind or washed away by the rain. This, 
again, is a result of the lack of work morale of the garbage workers, but also the residents have 
to be blamed for disposing of their garbage carelessly in the street when the containers are 
already full. In our survey 90% of respondents stated that a "Lack of social responsibility of 
people" is to be blamed for the garbage situation in Havana, as already mentioned in section 
2 above and 50% did not believe that "Other people living in Havana are aware of the problems 
accruing from inefficient waste management". This shows that even Havana residents 
themselves hold their own peer group responsible (in parts) for the garbage problem. 
Summing up, regarding the insufficient quality of residual waste collection in Havana we have 
identified two main causes, technical problems with garbage trucks and containers on the one 
hand and a lack of motivation of residents as well as of garbage collectors to engage personally 
in a cleaner and more efficient waste collection management on the other.  
In principle, these causes are also responsible for the insufficient recovery of recyclable 
material from private waste, since recyclable material is part of the total private waste. 
Differently from residual waste, there are material incentives for extracting recyclable 
material from private garbage and for passing it on to the before-mentioned Buyback Centers. 
This can be done by private households directly. When they bring certain kinds of recyclable 
material like e.g. tin cans or glass bottles to the Buyback Centers, they are paid a small price 
for that like 8 CUP per kg of tin cans or 2.5 CUP for an empty rum bottle (for more price 
examples see Appendix). Another possibility is that the already mentioned Independent 
Contractors for Recyclable Material Collection collect the recyclable material from private 
households and private enterprises like restaurants or hostels and bring it to the Buyback 
                                                     
13  Recycled waste is classified into ferrous, non-ferrous scrap (copper, bronze, stainless steel, lead, aluminum) 
and non-metallic waste (glass, paper, cardboard, plastic, textiles). 
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Centers. The ICs pay households for the recyclable material an amount, that is even smaller 
than the price paid by the Buyback Centers, but the advantage for households is that they do 
not have to pass by the centers themselves. Further, young Pioneers as well as the Committees 
for the Defense of the Revolution organize campaigns where they separate and collect 
recyclable material at the private household and business level, where it is then picked up by 
the Recyclable Material Recovery Enterprises. No money payments are involved here. 
Recyclable material from private units is also collected by the communales. They also do not 
pay the private units but, differently from the Pioneers and the CDRs, they sell the recyclable 
material to the RMREs.  
This shows that in some of the transactions regarding the collection of recyclable material 
money payments are involved. One might expect that these payments trigger an efficient 
management of the recyclable private waste. Unfortunately, this is not the case. In reality, a 
considerable part of the recyclable material contained in private waste remains unrecovered. 
The main reasons for that lie in the extremely low prices that are paid by the RMREs for 
recyclable material (cf. Appendix). These prices are administered prices and not market prices. 
Therefore, they do not indicate real scarcities of materials. The prices paid at every stage of 
this waste "supply chain" are much too low to set sufficient incentives to the agents involved 
in that chain. Differently from the Independent Contractors and the Cooperatives whose 
managers live off the profits they make, the Buyback Centers and the communales are non-
profit government institutions so that their managers and workers do not benefit personally 
from the profits made by their organization. Therefore, profits do not set personal incentives 
to motivate them.  
Looking at the public enterprises, these are obliged to separate their waste and to forward 
the recyclable material either to the communales or to the Cooperatives. They are paid only 
for the material they pass on to the CRMRs, but not for the material collected by the 
communales. On which basis they decide how much of their recyclable material they sell to 
the CRMRs and how much they give without being paid to the communales is not clear. If they 
decided on the basis of prices and profits only, they would sell all of their recyclable material 
to the Cooperatives, which is not the case in reality. So, again we see that the price system 
has no sufficient allocative impact on this sector.  
Summing up, since the prices that are paid within the waste collection and recycling system 
of Cuba are no market prices they do not indicate the true scarcity of certain waste 
components and they do not set incentives for the decision makers in that system to strive for 
efficiency.  
 
4.  How to do better – An incentive-based approach 
Especially in the case of private households and enterprises, the Cuban waste management 
system fails to ensure a halfway regular collection of garbage and with that a halfway 
acceptable condition of the streets under hygienic and aesthetic aspects. Further, the actual 
organization of the waste management does not lead to a satisfactory degree of recycling and 
resource recovery from waste though this would be highly desirable, especially for a country 
like Cuba which has to import much of the raw materials it needs for its production industry.  
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When reflecting upon possibilities to improve this situation many things come to one's mind 
which in the end turn out not to be realistic in the case of Cuba. It would be desirable to have 
modern waste collection trucks which have a higher loading capacity and which break down 
less frequently than the trucks used now in Cuba. It would also be nice to have them equipped 
with GPS chips so that they can be kept under permanent surveillance and called back in case 
they leave their prescribed route. Substituting the present garbage containers by new ones 
would definitely be helpful and renewing and enhancing the whole recycling industry by 
modern industrial recycling plants would mean a great leap forward for recycling in Cuba. 
Unfortunately, this kind of suggestion is not helpful in the case of Cuba since there is not 
enough capital available for the realization of such ideas. Therefore, we want to focus our 
attention in this section on possibilities to improve the efficiency of the waste management 
system without costly investments. This leads us directly to considerations regarding the 
implementation of an enhanced system of incentives for people at all stages of the waste 
collection and recycling process to make them strive for more efficiency and better results.  
 4.1 Incentives to comply – A short overview 
While Cuban waste management is impaired by a lack of capital, the lack of positive 
motivation and the non-cooperative behavior of residents as well as of waste workers are also 
responsible to a large extent for the desolate state of the Cuban waste management. People, 
no matter if workers or private citizens, could contribute in many different ways to an 
improvement of the garbage situation also without new technical equipment. Garbage 
workers like the drivers of garbage collection trucks or the members of the street-cleaning 
service could simply stick to their stipulated working schedules in their everyday practice and 
fulfil their duties as thoroughly as possible with the technical equipment at hand. This would 
mean more working effort for them and maybe even longer working hours. The question 
arises how they could be motivated to take this trouble or, conversely, why they do not do it 
at present. Private households could show more discipline in dealing with their personal 
garbage. They could separate it into residual waste and recyclable material already at the 
household level and dump it into separate waste containers. Of course, this would have to be 
organized by somebody, e.g. by the neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the 
Revolution which are located in every housing area and in the large housing compounds. 
Households could refrain from dumping their garbage in the street when the containers are 
already overflowing and call the communales to remove the garbage, instead. They could also 
bring the recyclable material components of their garbage personally to the Buyback Centers 
if the communales fail to collect them. Again, these improvements would require additional 
efforts by households and the same questions arise as before: Why have they not done these 
things already in the past? How can they be motivated to do them in the future? Similar 
questions could be asked regarding all other agents involved in the garbage management of 
Cuba.  
An obvious answer to these questions is that we are dealing with a typical public good problem 
here. A cleaner Havana and a higher recycling rate could be enjoyed by all citizens the same, 
no matter if they personally contributed to reaching these goals or not. Therefore, the optimal 
strategy for the individual citizen or worker is "free riding", i.e. making no personal efforts to 
improve the waste situation and wait for others to do this. This strategy is optimal for the 
typical homo oeconomicus but, as is well known and as behavioral economics theory tells us, 
there, in principle, are good reasons for individuals to contribute voluntarily to the provision 
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of a public good if there are other incentives to do so than the consumption of the public good 
alone. We will briefly review the different kinds of incentives that might be effective here. In 
the respective literature, two main categories of incentives or motivations are discussed, 
namely extrinsic and intrinsic incentives (cf. e.g. Bénabou and Tirole 2003, Osterloh and Frey 
2000). Sometimes as a third category "reputational incentives" (cf. e.g. Bénabou and Tirole 
2006 or Ariely et al. 2009) are mentioned, though these are often subsumed under the 
broader categories of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives, too. We will briefly discuss the 
different kinds of incentives with respect to their usefulness for increasing people's readiness 
to contribute voluntarily to an improvement of the waste situation in Cuba. 
Extrinsic incentives 
There are various different forms of extrinsic incentives or motives to contribute personally to 
the provision of a public good or to do "something good" in general. Most common are 
material incentives and, especially, monetary incentives like subsidies, tax reductions or 
premiums paid for doing something good for society as a whole (like contributing to the 
provision of a public good). Material incentives are also effective on an individual level where 
reciprocity effects play an important role (cf. e.g. Ahlheim et al. 2013). Non-monetary material 
incentives could be in-kind presents like free tickets for a football game or for the opera or a 
case of champagne etc. Non-material extrinsic incentives to do good deeds are e.g. honorary 
titles, awards, medals, priority seating at official receptions, public praise by politicians or by 
the media etc. Also suitable nudges (cf. Sunstein and Thaler 2008) like footprints painted on 
the pavement which lead to a waste bin can motivate people to pro-social behavior. An 
important and highly effective form of non-material extrinsic incentives is the compliance with 
social norms in order to enhance one's social standing and reputation, thereby increasing 
one's social capital (cf. Coleman 1990). Complying with the requirements of social norms in 
order to enhance one's social standing is typically triggered by the so-called "image 
motivation" or "signaling motivation" for pro-social behavior (cf. Ariely et al. 2009, p. 544). 
This refers to "an individual’s tendency to be motivated partly by others’ perceptions" and the 
"desire to be liked and respected by others and by one’s self" (cf. Ariely et al. 2009, p. 544). 
Doing good deeds in order to impress others and the search for social approval are parts of a 
person's impression management which can be described as "the process by which individuals 
attempt to control the impressions others form of them" (cf. Leary and Kowalski 1990, p. 34). 
Complying with generally accepted social norms helps also to avoid being punished by one's 
peer group or by society as a whole for betraying the common values and believes of this 
group. The threat of being shamed in public or in front of a group is especially successful as an 
extrinsic motivator when the monitoring of people's behavior (e.g. by neighbors, colleagues, 
family, media etc.) is highly effective. This discussion shows that external incentives work 
according to the sticks-and-carrots principle by setting positive incentives through (material 
or non-material) rewards on the one hand and negative incentives by the threat of social 
punishment on the other.  
Intrinsic incentives   
Typical intrinsic incentives arise from the value of a good deed per se without any reference 
to the perception of one's deed by others and by their reaction (reward or punishment) to it. 
In this case, a good deed is done for its own sake and not for the approval by others. Intrinsic 
incentives can be provided by altruistic, pro-social, pro-environmental or otherwise idealistic 
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preferences, which make this kind of behavior more attractive without an external impulse. 
Altruistic preferences can be "purely altruistic" in the sense that other people's wellbeing or 
the wellbeing of society as a whole is important for the respective individual. Preferences can 
be also "impurely altruistic" in the sense of Andreoni (1989, p. 1451), whenever good deeds 
are done because they cause a feeling of "warm glow of giving" (cf. Andreoni 1990) for the 
respective individual, though she does not care at all for the wellbeing of others. In this case 
doing good deeds is also an instrument of enhancing one's self-image and enjoying the result, 
i.e. enjoying the feeling of being a good person or a good citizen. Obviously, this mechanism 
depends on the existence of an ideal self-image or an ideal identity, which people want to 
resemble as closely as possible. Therefore, this kind of incentive can be viewed as part of a 
person's identity management, i.e. her trying to act according to her own ideal identity (cf. 
Bénabou and Tirole 2011 or Akerlof and Kranton 2000). In psychology, there are various 
different concepts of identity and of how it is formed. Following Akerlof's and Kranton's 
approach identity or "a person's sense of self" (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, p. 715) depends 
among other things on her socio-economic characteristics (like e.g. being a woman, belonging 
to the working class, being a member of a Christian church or the Communist Party or an 
environmental group etc.) and the behavioral expectations that are connected with these 
characteristics by society and by oneself. As member of a Christian church, you should behave 
according to the ideals of the church, e.g. by following the Ten Commandments. If you violate 
one of them and others observe this they will react to your wrong behavior and punish you in 
one way or the other (e.g. by excluding you from their community). This is also the case with 
violating social norms in general, but identity economics according to Akerlof and Kranton 
points to an additional effect: Even if nobody notices your misbehavior, you will have a bad 
conscience because you know that your behavior contradicts your personal convictions and 
disappoints the expectations you place in yourself. "Violating the prescriptions evokes anxiety 
and discomfort in oneself and in others", as Akerlof and Kranton (2000, p. 716/17) put it. 
Therefore, the expectations that a person as well as her peer group or as society as a whole 
connects with her socio-demographic characteristics has an important influence on her 
behavior even without external punishment or reward. This effect offers another possibility 
to change people's behavior towards more pro-social actions by adjusting the expectations or 
"prescriptions" (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, p. 719) connected with people's social identity 
appropriately.   
One of the advantages of intrinsic over extrinsic motivation is that intrinsic motivation does 
not require any external monitoring or administration like e.g. tax privileges or payments of 
premiums or subsidies do. Therefore, intrinsic incentives seem to be superior to extrinsic 
incentives under the aspect of minimizing transaction costs. Before intrinsic incentives can 
become effective, the appropriate social norms ("Waste separation is important for our 
country, therefore all good citizens should do it") or social identities ("A good Cuban 
communist should defend the achievements of the great Cuban Revolution by separating 
waste in order to save raw materials and increase the recycling rate of our country") have to 
be created and implanted in the thinking of people. This takes much more time than the 
imposition of a new tax or fee or the introduction of new subsidies and, of course, the effect 
of new social norms is not certain ex ante. Therefore, a combination of extrinsic and intrinsic 
incentives seems to be advisable for a successful employment of this instrument in practical 
policy.  
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Interaction effects   
There is a large body of literature on the possible interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
incentives. Most of this literature shows, based on lab experiments, that the introduction of 
extrinsic material incentives like the payment of premiums, granting tax privileges or subsidies 
etc. can diminish or even eliminate intrinsic motivations for good deeds or for pro-social 
behavior (cf. e.g. Lepper et al. 1982, Frey 1994, Fehr and Falk 1999, Fehr and Schmidt 2000, 
Frey and Jegen 2001, Bénabou and Tirole 2003 and 2006). This is known as the crowding-out 
effect or "overjustification effect" (Bénabou and Tirole 2006, p. 1654) of extrinsic incentives 
on intrinsic incentives. If one feels good because one voluntarily separates one's own garbage 
in order to contribute to resource saving for the country (or for the world), this good feeling 
is impaired if garbage separation suddenly becomes mandatory by law and trespassing of this 
law is punished, or if government suddenly introduces a fee on unseparated garbage or pays 
a premium for people who separate their garbage. In these cases the material reward for 
complying with the idealistic goal of resource saving devaluates one's voluntary efforts 
morally and, thereby, decreases the intrinsic motivation for these efforts. It undermines one's 
intention to enhance one's self-image or one's warm glow-feelings as well as the goal of 
enhancing one's reputation in the eyes of others, because now they might think that one is 
doing the good deed only because of the money. The extrinsic incentive might even reverse 
one's good intentions by triggering psychological reactance effects (cf. e.g. Hong and Faedda 
1996 or Steindl et al. 2015).  
Experiments have also shown that the crowding-out effect of introducing material incentives 
is often not reversible. If the intrinsic motivation has been crowded-out by extrinsic material 
incentives and if these extrinsic incentives are later abolished, the intrinsic motivation does 
often not return, at least not with the initial intensity (cf. Gneezy et al. 2011). Consequently, 
government should be very careful with introducing extrinsic incentives for pro-social 
behavior like garbage separation because this might reduce the intrinsic motivation of people 
to comply voluntarily with the overall ideal of resource saving and having a clean city. Once 
the extrinsic incentive has been introduced, there will be no way back to regain the initial level 
of intrinsic motivation of people. Therefore, before introducing new extrinsic incentives 
government should always check for the existence of intrinsic motivations in the respective 
field.   
4.2 Improving the Cuban waste management system 
The two main goals of reforming the Cuban waste management would be, firstly, to provide 
a more reliable and effective waste collection service and, secondly, to realize a higher rate of 
recycling and resource recovery from waste. In this section, we will consider practical 
possibilities to realize these two goals.  
The first thing that comes to one's mind when looking at the Cuban waste management 
system as illustrated in fig. 1 is that it is rather complicated, if not confusing. Too many 
institutions are involved, responsibilities are not clear and there are many duplications of 
tasks. Therefore, its organizational structure should be simplified fundamentally in order to 
make it more efficient and to implement a consistent incentive system to trigger pro-social 
behavior in the whole waste management sector. Simplification of the organizational 
structure requires a higher degree of specialization on the side of those institutions who are 
responsible for the collection and further treatment of residual waste RW as well as of 
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recyclable materials RM. As can be seen from fig. 1, the collection of residual waste from the 
private as well as from the public sector lies in the responsibility of the communales. Although 
they are obviously doing a very poor job in RW collection alone, they are also involved in 
collecting RM from the public as well as the private sector and forwarding it to the recycling 
industry RMRE. Their performance in the RM business is also poor since they have no 
incentives whatsoever to do better. There are no monetary rewards for the workers of the 
communales for their work besides their rather low fixed salaries. Though the employees of 
the communales are also paid small premiums on top of their base salaries as incentives if 
they show extra work effort on their job, these payments are rather low. If the communales 
as firms collect recyclable material from private and/or public waste they can sell these 
materials to the Recyclable Materials Recovery Enterprises and get paid for it. Of course, these 
payments do not increase workers' incomes. Therefore, it often happens that workers put 
aside part of the recyclable materials they collect and bring them privately and secretly to the 
payback centers where they get paid for them. That means that the performance of the 
communales in RM collection is also inefficient and unsatisfactory.  
Therefore, we recommend that the communales give up the collection of RM completely and 
specialize in the collection and deposition of residual waste RW only. In this case, the 
professional collection of recyclable materials would be left to the private agents, i.e. the 
independent contractors and the Cooperatives, who have a strong economic interest in doing 
a good job since they make their incomes from RM collection. In order to increase the work 
effectiveness of the communales it would be necessary to pay higher wages to make the jobs 
more attractive for workers and to increase the performance bonuses (monetary or in-kind) 
in order to trigger extra efforts. As a complementary measure, the possibility to lay off workers 
if they show a low work performance should be introduced. Of course, a strict monitoring of 
workers' performance on the job would be necessary. The combination of higher wages and 
higher material incentives for better work on the one hand and the threat of losing one's job 
in case of a low work performance on the other should motivate the workers of the 
communales to increase their work efforts. These measures could be complemented by the 
introduction of non-material extrinsic rewards like honorary titles (e.g. "worker of the month") 
or by intrinsic incentives in the sense of building up an appropriate social identity of good 
garbage workers. For that, society as well as workers themselves should be made aware of 
the immense importance of their job for the health of society and environment and of the 
responsibility they bear. This might trigger a kind of "warm glow" feeling if they are doing a 
good job. If most of the workers of the communales can be "infected" with a higher work 
morale resulting from their awareness of the importance of their job something like a new 
"corporate spirit" or "corporate identity" of the communales might develop. This could also 
influence the social interaction between workers in the sense that those who are lazy and 
doing a sloppy job are reproached by the others because they violate the social norms of 
professional work behavior. Such a peer-based monitoring system would be desirable because 
it would make the monitoring of workers by their superiors more or less redundant, which 
implies reducing transaction cost and overcoming the principal-agent problems typically 
arising in this context.  
Summing up, for the accomplishment of the first of the above-mentioned goals, i.e. an 
improvement of garbage collection, the communales should concentrate their efforts on the 
collection of RW only and leave the collection of recyclable materials to private institutions 
like the independent contractors and the Cooperatives, because, differently from the 
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communales, for ICs and CRMRs it is in their own best material interest to do a good job. In 
order to increase the performance of their workers the communales should increase wages 
and performance bonuses while, at the same time, introducing the possibility to lay off low-
performers. Complementary non-material extrinsic and intrinsic incentives would be helpful. 
Similar combinations of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives might be effective also for the other 
waste-related government agencies like the Buyback Centers and the Recyclable Materials 
Recovery Enterprises.  
The second goal of reforming the Cuban waste management system is an increase of the waste 
recycling rate. A precondition for reaching this goal is a sufficient rate of waste separation in 
the public as well as in the private sector. In the public sector, government-controlled firms 
and institutions are forced by law to separate their waste, so that the RW fraction of the waste 
can be picked up by the communales who are now specialized in this task only. The RM will be 
collected by the private Cooperatives who are spin-offs from former public firms, which have 
been privatized. Typically, they have a good technical equipment and, therefore, the 
possibility to recycle the RM they collect before selling it on the national market to production 
firms. A high recycling rate and a thorough RM collection are in their own economic interest. 
Together with an improved performance of the communales and a strict monitoring of the 
waste separation by the public firms this seems to ensure a successful waste collection and 
recycling system in the public sector. 
For the overall success of the garbage collection and recycling system, the private sector, i.e. 
private households and small private enterprises, play an important role. From fig. 1 it can be 
seen that the decision problem of this sector regarding the handling of garbage consists of 
two stages. At the first stage, private agents have to decide on their personal waste separation 
rate. Households who do not separate their garbage at all can simply drop it into the garbage 
containers in their streets where it is picked up by the communales. This means no personal 
effort and no cost for them, but there is also no financial reward. If they separate their 
garbage, they have the possibility to sell the RM part directly to the Buyback Centers or to the 
ICs, which means that separation is rewarded financially. The low waste separation rate of 
private households shows that this reward is much too small to motivate private waste 
separation sufficiently. Therefore, stronger incentives for waste separation like higher 
compensation payments and better information on the national importance of waste 
separation and recycling would be helpful to create extrinsic as well as intrinsic motivation to 
comply with the goals of better waste management.  
If households decide to separate (part of) their garbage, they have five different possibilities 
under the present system to forward the recyclable part of their garbage to the Recyclable 
Materials Recovery Enterprises, as is shown in fig. 1: They can bring their recyclable material 
directly to the Buyback Centers or they can leave it to the communales, the Independent 
Contractors for recyclable material collection, the Cooperatives for Recyclable Materials 
Recovery  or the Young Pioneers or to the neighborhood committees for the Defense of the 
Revolution in the course of their waste collection campaigns. This variety of different 
possibilities makes the decision problem of the private sector rather confusing, as is shown in 
fig. 1, and the incentives accruing from the different possibilities are not clear. In order to 
make this decision problem of households clearer and more transparent we suggest, as 
already explained, that the communales do not deal with RM at all. Further, we recommend 
that the Cooperatives focus their activities on the collection and recycling of RM from the 
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public sector, where the RM volume is much greater than in the private sector, and leave the 
private sector to the ICs. This reduces the complexity of the garbage decision problem in the 
private sector considerably, as is shown in fig. 3. Now households have the possibility to either 
bring their RM directly to the Buyback Centers and get paid for it or sell it to the ICs who pick 
up the RM at people's homes. The Buyback Centers pay higher prices for the RM but people 
have to bring the RM there themselves and they have to clean the materials (bottles, cans 
etc.) before. So the decision which of these two possibilities they choose will depend on the 
difference between the prices paid by the Buyback Centers and the ICs, where the prices paid 
by the Buyback Centers to households and private firms have to be adjusted for the 
opportunity cost of the time and effort invested in cleaning the RM and bringing it to the 
Buyback Centers. For private agents who have the possibility to earn additional money if they 
do some work instead of cleaning RM and bringing it to the Buyback Centers will prefer to sell 
their RM to the ICs instead of handling it themselves, while old and/or jobless people might 
possibly prefer to bring their cleaned RM to the Buyback Centers directly.  
 
 
-  Fig. 3: Simplified Waste Management System of Cuba - 
 
In fig. 3 a third possibility of how to deal with RM in the private sector is shown in brackets. 
The Young Pioneers as well as the neighborhood committees (CDR) organize waste collection 
campaigns from time to time where they collect RM from private households or firms and 
bring it to the Buyback Centers. If households leave their RM to the Young Pioneers or to the 
neighborhood committees, they obtain no financial compensation. Nevertheless, supporting 
these campaigns increases one's reputation and social capital in the neighborhood so that 
there exist non-material incentives to participate in these campaigns, which are organized 
only at irregular time intervals, anyway. These immaterial incentives have to be traded off 
against the material incentives to give the RM to the Buyback Centers of the ICs.  
 
- 19 – 
5.  Concluding remarks 
Even though the Cuban population is far from being an affluent consumer society, it faces 
severe problems with the waste it produces. If one abstracts from the threats arising from 
careless waste deposition in unsafe landfills there remain two important waste problems. One 
is the inefficient and unreliable garbage collection practice and the second is the insufficient 
waste recycling and resource recovery in Cuba. In this paper, we dealt with both problems 
from an empirical as well as a theoretical perspective.  
In the empirical part, we presented the results of a small survey we conducted in the city of 
Havana. This survey showed that residents of Havana are well aware of the garbage collection 
problem and the resulting threats to human health and to the environment. It turned out that 
people find it important to implement a more effective and reliable waste management in 
Havana and that they would also be willing to contribute personally and financially to its 
realization. These results emphasize the relevance of the waste topic for the local people. In 
the theoretical part of our paper, we then analyzed the structure of the Cuban waste 
management system and tried to identify the sources of its deficiencies. It showed that 
besides the poor state of the technical equipment one of the main causes of the Cuban waste 
collection and recycling problem is the lack of cooperation of all parties concerned with waste 
management, i.e. private households, private and public enterprises and also the employees 
of the garbage collection firms. In spite of the urgency with which the respondents of our 
survey demanded a reform of the waste collection in Havana in order to get cleaner streets 
and a less health-threatening environment in practice nobody seems to care. Households do 
not separate their garbage and drop it, instead, unseparated into the containers in the streets 
or directly on the pavement if the containers are full. The waste workers pick up the containers 
infrequently and incompletely and do not care to clean up the streets if garbage has been 
dropped beside the containers. As one of the main reasons for this misbehavior we identified 
a lack of appropriate incentives for households as well as firms and their employees to strive 
for a better garbage situation and to act in a more responsible and more pro-social way. 
Another reason is the confusing and seemingly unstructured organization of the Cuban waste 
collection and recycling system, which contains many duplications of tasks so that in the end 
nobody feels responsible. Since a modernization of the technical equipment of the waste 
sector seems quite unrealistic considering the dramatic lack of capital in all sectors of the 
Cuban economy we suggested, instead, a fundamental reorganization of the waste 
management system with a clear structure of responsibilities and a transparent system of 
material as well as immaterial incentives to cooperate for all parties involved in that system. 
In this context, the implementation of immaterial incentives like appropriate social norms, 
which are followed (and also monitored) by citizens and waste workers seems to be especially 
important. A new pro-social spirit within the Cuban population, which involves also an 
appropriate handling of garbage, appears to be a promising way to improve the dismal 
garbage situation in Cuba. Other countries like e.g. Germany have had good experience with 
this inexpensive but highly effective instrument of government policy in the waste sector, 
which is highly recommended especially for countries with insufficient capital resources.  
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Appendix: Prices paid by the Buyback Centers for recyclable materials 
Product Unit Price 
Glass   
Pharmacy bottles U 0.01 
Medicine bottles from 15 to 240 ml U 0.30 
Glass container, 314 ml U 1.00 
Glass container, 212 ml U 1.00 
Glass container, 997 ml U 1.00 
Glass container, 250 ml U 1.00 
Bottles of Rum, 700 ml U 2.50 
Bottles of Rum, 750 ml U 2.50 
Bottles of Rum, 1000 ml U 2.50 
Bottles of wine and liquors  U 0.02 
Bottles of Bordolesa wines 700 and 750 ml U 1.00 
Bottles of beer and malt (amber), 350 ml U 1.20 
Bottles of beer (green), 350 ml U 1.20 
Bottles of imported malt, lightened, 250 ml U 0.80 
Bottles of imported malt and beer, lightened, 330 ml U 0.60 
Heavy amber and green bottles of malt and beer, 350 ml, national 
production 
U 0.60 
Paper   
Corrugated paper Kg 1.25 
White paper with printing Kg 1.10 
Ordinary paper Kg 0.80 
Magazines and printed matter (gazette) Kg 1.50 
Non-metallic (does not include glass containers)   
Miscellaneous textile waste Kg 0.09 
Polyethylene B / D (LDPE): from bags of milk, yogurt, chocolatín. Clean and 
dry. 
Kg 5.00 
Polyethylene A / D (HDPE), packaging of shampoo, conditioner, cream, 
medicine, milk, yogurt, deodorant, air freshener and descaler and others 
(without the ball) 
Kg 6.50 
Polyethylene A / D (HDPE) of injection from tanks, buckets Kg 6.50 
Polyethylene A / D (HDPE)of injection from boxes   
Polyethylene B / D (LDPE): tops of oil pommels, cereal containers, milk and 
other flexible tops, containers with ID 4 and their acronyms 
Kg 5.00 
Polypropylene (PP): tops deodorant pommels and containers with 
identification 5 and acronyms PP. 
Kg 5.00 
Polystyrene (PS): plastic furniture, refrigerators, TV and air conditioners Kg 5.00 
Post-consumer PET plastic waste (water, soft drinks, cosmetics, medicine, 
beverages and others) 
Kg 5.00 
Post-consumer PET plastic waste (oil) Kg 5.00 
Ferrous Metal Scrap   
Scrap steel (h / 800x500x500) Kg 0.60 
Scrap steel out of measure Kg 0.40 
Cast iron scrap generated by the population Kg 0.20 
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Aluminum Scrap   
Scrap aluminum, tools and old lamps Kg 13.00 
Aluminum profiles Kg 13.00 
Cast aluminum with not more than 2% steel (includes pistons and 
crankcase) 
Kg 13.00 
Aluminum radiators with copper content Kg 8.00 
Aluminum cans contained beer, soft drinks and other drinks Kg 8.00 
Bronze Scrap   
Bronze pieces of different alloys Kg 13.00 
Mixed brass pieces Kg 12.00 
Bronze chip and shale Kg 3.00 
Copper Scrap   
Copper for refine Kg 10.00 
Lead Scrap   
Pure soft lead (pieces of lead) Kg 0.80 
Storage battery with lead content Kg 0.70 
Non-Ferrous Metal Scrap   
Calamina Zamac or Cayuela, Zinc, Aluminum and other alloys Kg 4.00 
Stainless steel scrap of different alloys Kg 6.00 
Source: http://www.degranma.co.cu/materia-prima/listado-de-productos [21st August 2018]. 
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